Philip Shetler-Jones
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There are a few too many double standards in the subtext here, even for a column 'on trade'. (1) "the chance that the American public will become better informed", but apparently only about what Yasukuni means (the meaning revealed to this author is assumed to be the one in question). But why stop there? How about also becoming better informed about the credibility of the US led war crimes tribunal process itself? And rehabilitation of several war crimes suspects as part of the 'reverse course' as a Cold War expedient? (2) The government of China, which so cherishes academic freedom, asking that "the Japanese government faces history with the right attitude". (3) Obama (he of secret drone strikes, zero accountability for recent cases of torture, leader of a nation that shuns the international criminal court), telling the government of Japan 'not on my watch' for visits to the equivalent of Arlington. Come, come.
I think use of the term WMD is really best avoided here. One, it is counter-productive because it adds to the sense of scale, which plays into the terrorist narrative. Two, the term WMD is for many now associated with a policy of government deceit and incompetence. Using it in this context suggests a failure to acknowledge that, either through ignorance or indifference. Whatever the technical justification on a strategic level it's bad stratcom policy.
"The whole debate over strategic communications ignores the reality that we live increasingly in a participatory culture" - I don't know what debate this refers to, but this statement doesn't match up with the definition of strategic communications that I was taught (it goes something like this: "STRATCOM = things you do to trigger a conversation among others, which produces results that benefit your interests").
Good idea. How about taking a look at how the concept of 'antifragile' relates to FP? Taleb's book talks about 'barbell' pattern bets and maximising 'optionality' as ways we can position ourselves to benefit from volatility and the unexpected. That would mean nations being more open to experimentation with policy approaches, even if some fail. And it might mean states become more nimble in the sense of being better at taking opportunities when they come up - a more refined form of 'crisis management', if you like.
The US military scales its lift capability for its own strategic reasons, not because it calculates for extra planes to help out allies once in a while. If the planes are not needed for some other task, then this is a good use for them. Flying a few thousand French a few thousand miles is small change and as you say, refusing to help would not force the French to procure this capability. Lending the lift to France is a low-cost gesture that pays off well in terms of alliance relations. Refusing to help would look petty and they would just muddle through anyway. The gain from a successful CT operation (if it proves to be so) easily outweighs the cost so enough with the whining.
If "the psychological gap between the United States and Europe is growing wider", how can Europe "coordinate policies and strategies with the United States... forge alliances, issue by issue, with one or more emerging powers"? For example, with respect to maritime security in Asia?
You propose that if Europe "cleans up its finances, kick-starts sufficient levels of growth, and improves efficiency without becoming too technocratic, its future will be enviable", but in order to be able to coordinate as you propose, wouldn't it also be necessary that European publics are convinced of shared political and security interests?
Is it just China and the USA, or do Europeans also have to "cede certain claims and parts of [our] mythology"? But then if pushed to decide, which mythology would we cede - that of national identity or our mythology of great power status?
Also, check this out for some ideas:
US Task Force 2012 - Look East, Act East: Transatlantic Strategies in the Asia-Pacific Region
"the United States needs to work more closely with Europe on Asian issues -- trade, human rights, and political developments. I am not quite sure where he is going with this, or what it means."
European nations have been doing their own 'pivot' to Asia. I recently posted a bit of analysis on the recent UK and French moves in this direction. First the UK's PM Cameron becomes Japan's first new defense partner after Tokyo loosened its restrictions on arms exports. Then France's new minister of defense speaking at the Shangri-La dialogue hints that Paris might be a more neutral partner for Asian nations, implicitly slighting the US by deriding the idea of containing China as 'out of date'. Both nations are exploring the economic and geo-strategic potential of the emerging multi-polar world order, and the results for their relationship with the USA are not at all clear.
Just four months after Japan relaxed its ban on arms exports, Noda signed a deal with the UK to jointly produce and develop defense technology. There is an interesting tie-in between Japan's decision to branch out from its partnership with the US and the UK's recent moves to return to the Asia Pacific security as a security player, and a bridge to Europe. Read more at:
Don't miss the British Pivot to Asia..